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Introduction 
The USA Patriot Act has presented librarians in the United States with 
a dilemma. There is a need to balance national security against values 
embedded in a long-standing American understanding of civil liberty and 
human rights. How exactly to maintain the correct balance, or even to think 
it through, what questions to raise, and what roles librarians and ethicists 
have in such deliberations in a democracy in which citizens elect leaders to 
make decisions for them, is still to be worked out. The recent reauthorization 
of the USA Patriot Act has not put to rest this dilemma. A discussion of the 
problems created for libraries by the USA Patriot Act and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act has been presented in detail by librarians and 
information specialists (Jaeger, Bertot, & McClure, 2003 and Jaeger, McClure, 
Bertot, & Snead, 2004, Martorella, 2006). It initially appeared that the effect 
on libraries had been reduced in the reauthorized Act and that much called 
for by the American Library Association (ALA) had been adopted (American 
Library Association, 2006b, 2006c). However the exact application of the 
reauthorized Act, and of other security legislation, to libraries remains 
unclear at this time and continues to be a matter of concern for the ALA 
(American Library Association, 2006a). Ultimately, the challenges, both to 
national security and to civil liberties and human rights, will not go away with 
the passage, or reauthorization, of any one act and the need to maintain the 
balance of liberty and security, and how to argue for such balance, remain a 
permanent features of our times.  
Failing an overall philosophical and ethical solution to the problem of 
balancing liberty and security ethicists can begin to address this issue by 
examining limited and specific responses to the need for balance and then 
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subjecting these responses to an ethical critique. Such responses may come 
from many sources. They may be memos issued by government officials in 
support of torture or Supreme Court decisions limiting the power of the 
federal executive branch to hold citizens and others indefinitely without 
hearings or access to legal counsel. They may also be the official 
pronouncements of non-governmental institutions and organizations made in 
response to government actions. The latter form of response is especially 
important because the United States has a long tradition of an active civil 
society. These are the strong institutions that stand between the government 
and citizens and through which citizens may act. By offering a buffer and by 
allowing political culture to develop they are a defense of freedom in modern 
states. This is a position argued for by a range of writers as diverse as 
Tocqueville (1945), Arendt (1951) and Oakeshott (1962). As the nation finds 
the correct balance or, more likely, continues to struggle to find it, such 
institutions must play their role. It will be by their influence, in their 
responses, that societal restraint and the preservation of the best of 
American values will occur.  
Therefore, one reasonable area of ethical analysis should be the 
deliberations of non-governmental organizations. This would not be to 
criticize such organizations but, precisely because their choices are so 
important, to strengthen their forms of argumentation and to assist their 
members in becoming more reflective about, and broad-based in, their 
selection of arguments. The American Library Association is one such 
important institution of civil society. As a profession it has a long history of 
self-governance. As an institution dealing with the organization, preservation, 
and transmission of information and knowledge much of its history has been 
one of grappling with the questions of what constitutes freedom of access to 
information, freedom of thought and expression, and the role of such 
freedoms in the United States. The number of books written on the ALA 's 
struggles with these issues is a respectable one. Geller (1984), Wiegand 
(1986), and Robbins (1996) are among the more prominent. It is 
appropriate, as an ethical exercise, that its forms of argumentation be 
analyzed in response to the present attempts to restrict such freedoms in the 
defense of democracy.  
In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorists attacks the United 
States Congress passed special security and anti-terrorism legislation which 
included the USA Patriot Act. This legislation was renewed in 2006. In 
response to the passage of the Act in 2001, two Councils of the American 
Library Association passed resolutions CD19.1 and CD 20.1 (reproduced in 
Appendices I and II) reaffirming the basic principles of the ALA. The following 
is a study in professional ethics related to the reasoning of the ALA as 
contained in those documents and of the American Library Association's 
reasoning as it is generally understood by commentators.  
Forms of Ethical Argumentation Used by the ALA  
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Thinking through is a philosophic endeavor, albeit one which may not 
be easily available to those in the heat of debate and who have before them 
the concrete project of formulating a specific policy or resolution. However in 
the area of professional ethics, and probably especially there, a place must 
be carved out for the process of thinking through the many ethical issues 
which must be addressed in making professional decisions. In this case the 
issues are specific to the library profession (freedom of access to information 
and confidentiality/privacy of records) but the issues have larger 
ramifications for society. By thinking through these issues ethicists, 
professional librarians, and ultimately society as a whole, can be brought to 
new arguments for, and understandings of, freedom of access to information 
and for confidentiality/privacy rights.  
A review of two early resolutions of the ALA adopted in immediate 
response to the USA Patriot Act as well as a review of major commentators 
on library ethics reveals that the dominant forms of argumentation employed 
by the ALA are either types of utilitarianism or forms of rights discourse that 
are asserted rather than argued for. The majority of the earlier 
commentators on library ethics have focused on the ALA 's Library Bill of 
Rights. For instance, Frické, Mathiesen, and Fallis (2000) in an attempt to 
introduce Rawlsian principles into the field, hold that utilitarianism is the form 
of argumentation used by members of the ALA in defending the Library Bill of 
Rights. Doyle (2002) agrees that utilitarianism is the primary form of 
justification used in the library field but challenges any attempt to ground 
freedom of access anew in a Rawlsian version of the social contract. Instead, 
Doyle argues in favor of retaining the utilitarian basis for the Association's 
arguments. Samek (2001) critiques both the Canadian and American Library 
Associations' statements of rights and builds on criticisms offered by earlier 
writers on the American version. Samek cites Baldwin's (1996) criticisms of 
the rights discourse of the ALA as going beyond what is mentioned in the 
First Amendment. Furthermore, both Baldwin and Samek point out that the 
ALA has opposed access limitations based on age whereas the US Bill of 
Rights is silent on such matters. Baldwin also points out that the Library Bill 
of Rights does not offer protection to any librarian who would defy legitimate 
government authority in upholding the principles of the American version of 
the Library Bill of Rights. Samek points out that Wiegand (1996) has called 
the Library Bill of Rights an example of “rhetoric unsupported by the legal 
principles that usually undergird rights.”  
The utilitarian argument used by the ALA for largely unlimited, and 
unmonitored, access to library materials, and for confidentiality/privacy, is 
that such rights or protections produce and encourage the development of 
divergent opinions and that a diversity of views is necessary for the 
functioning of a democracy. Frické and others point out the grounding of this 
argument in Mill's famous 1859 treatise On Liberty. Utilitarianism argues that 
moral decision-making requires a type of calculus, one which attempts to 
determine “the greatest good for the greatest number.” In order to 
determine the greatest good for a large and complex society many informed 
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voices must be heard with a variety of goods and choices put forward for 
consideration. An informed society, the members of which are allowed full 
access to necessary information, is required for this decision-making process 
to be successful.  
As also noted, such utilitarian notions are often combined in the ethical 
reasoning of the ALA with a rights discourse. As the commentators point out 
this discourse is not itself argued for except by referencing the US Bill of 
Rights or, on rare occasions, the UN Declaration of Rights. Baldwin, Samek, 
Wiegand (1996), and Wiegand (1986) have mounted respectable criticisms of 
this grounding.  
Both utilitarian arguments and rights discourse are present in CD 19.1 
where it states, “The American Library Association believes that freedom of 
expression is an inalienable human right, necessary to self-government, vital 
to the resistance of oppression, and crucial to the cause of justice…” and that 
the ALA “promotes dissemination of true and timely information necessary to 
the people in the exercise of their rights.” CD 20.1 employs similar 
arguments. There we read that libraries are a “critical force for promoting the 
free flow of unimpeded distribution of knowledge and information for 
individuals.” It also states that the USA Patriot Act, and related laws, 
“threaten the rights and liberties guaranteed under the United States 
Constitution and Bill of Rights” and that “sections of the USA Patriot Act are a 
present danger to the constitutional rights and privacy rights of library 
users.”  
Need for Alternative Forms of Ethical Argumentation  
Utilitarianism and rights discourse are woven together in the 
arguments put forth by the ALA in resisting the USA Patriot Act. Rights 
discourse tends to reference privacy and freedom of speech while 
utilitarianism leans more strongly toward supporting access to information. 
But they are related. Without sufficient expectations of privacy or the 
confidentiality of library records individuals would fear accessing certain 
types of information. Access to information makes little sense, at least 
politically and socially, unless one can use it to speak openly and to advocate 
for the type of political and social system one believes best. And in general 
both an individual's thoughts (expressed in personally held notes or in 
controlled circulation) and one's intimate discourses with important others 
may be necessary in order to allow for the full development of one's views. Is 
utilitarianism and the present use of rights discourse the only, or strongest, 
forms of argumentation that can be made by the ALA, and its members, for 
freedom of access to information and confidentiality/privacy of records?  
First, it must be admitted that in regard to rights discourse the fact 
that most state governments have recognized some rights to 
confidentiality/privacy for library records strengthens the ALA's rights 
discourse-based arguments. A series of US Supreme Court rulings in areas 
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other than librarianship where privacy rights are central (e.g. Griswald v 
Connecticut, Roe v Wade, Lawrence v Texas) has strengthened the notion 
that the right to privacy is implied in the US Constitution in areas beyond 
reasonable search and seizure protections. On the other hand, conservative 
jurists, legal theorists and politicians have resisted allowing Roe v Wade to 
rest unchallenged — arguing instead that it was wrongly decided precisely 
because it was based on what they assert to be a fictitious right to privacy in 
the Constitution. However, against such arguments it can be noted that 
prohibitions on federal government access to library records would seem to 
fall more clearly under Constitutional restrictions on unreasonable search and 
seizure than most other assertions of privacy rights.  
It is generally agreed in legal theory that no right is absolute. There is 
usually some balancing between various rights as well as between rights and 
what is taken to be other societal goods or necessities which limit the 
exercise of rights. For instance the CIPA (Child Internet Protection Act) 
decision of the Supreme Court has set limits on access by requiring some 
libraries to install filtering devices. It did so without a majority of justices 
joining in a decision, thereby leaving the reasons for the decision unclear. 
The Supreme Court has blocked the enforcement of COPA (Child Online 
Protection Act) but also failed to declare it unconstitutional. What all the 
court decisions and conflicting legal theories indicate is that the legal 
understanding of the limits and full extent of the right to privacy in general, 
and the right to access information and to the privacy of library records in 
particular, is not entirely settled. This is especially the case in regard to 
access rights. The problem in regard to the USA Patriot Act is that it, and 
related national security legislation, are the newest claims in an unsettled 
area of law. Such claims are furthermore being made in an environment 
altered by the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The controversies 
and differing views around CIPA, COPA, and the Patriot Act should, therefore, 
be seen as examples of the standard working out of a legal, and a public, 
consensus concerning the limits and extent of new types of rights claims and 
of government claims. Given this, an argument against the USA Patriot Act 
based on the assertion that access and confidentiality/privacy rights are 
grounded in the US Constitution and Bill of Rights is not a strong argument 
inasmuch as it invokes precisely that which is under contention.  
Utilitarian arguments for the need for free access to information may 
also be insufficient. They appear to be a particularly “thin” form of 
argumentation. By this is meant that they are ones that might easily be used 
to support intrusive government security measures if the threat is seen as 
strong enough – i.e., when the calculus of goods includes preventing a 
perceived serious threat to the survival of the nation. Stuart Hampshire 
(1979) makes a similar point in his critique of utilitarianism. His strongest 
argument is that utilitarianism is inordinately optimistic in its belief that the 
adoption of a moral calculus will lead to “progress.” He argues that this 
optimism is based, in part, on the historical origins of utilitarian thought and 
the use to which it was initially put. It was, at its inception, associated with 
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positions that did, in fact, reduce human suffering in the early industrializing 
nations. Hampshire points out, however, that by the time of Hiroshima and 
the Vietnam War “abstract computational morality” similar to that of classical 
utilitarianism could be used to justify the bombing of civilian targets. Such 
applications of the utilitarian calculus should at least give one pause. One 
must, therefore, ask if other arguments, drawn from other traditions, can be 
put forward.  
The remainder of the paper will take up alternative forms of ethical 
argumentation for access and confidentiality/privacy rights. None of the 
arguments put forth here are completely worked out in regard to the USA 
Patriot Act and other security legislation. They are offered as an exercise in 
thinking through the various issues associated with privacy/confidentiality 
and access facing American librarians today.  
Philosophical Reflections on Privacy: Modern Claims  
This article will take up privacy as the primary issue. Confidentiality of 
records can be attached to privacy concerns relatively easily. Access rights 
will be taken up at the end. Strong phenomenological arguments for privacy 
have been set forth in a book edited by Ferdinand D. Schoeman (1984). Most 
of the arguments there present privacy as a prerequisite for autonomy and 
most take closely related forms. There it is argued that privacy is 
psychologically and sociologically functional – allowing most of all for the 
development of the type of self that is a necessary component of healthy 
communities (Murphy, 1984). A person subjected to too much public scrutiny 
would lose uniqueness, autonomy, and a sense of herself as an individual. 
She would be forced to conform too much to others expectations and would 
become part of an undifferentiated mass (Bloustein, 1984). A sense of 
oneself as a moral being could not develop unless one were accorded the 
respect for the individual which privacy conveys (Reiman, 1984, 2004). 
Privacy relates to the development of a specific type of personality, one that 
is superior to other forms because it is able to form intimate relationships of 
trust, love and friendship (Fried, 1984). More recently, Tunick (2001) has 
held that communitarian notions can be used to bolster privacy rights. Citing 
the earlier work in the Schoeman volume he argues that community requires 
mutual trust and that an individual cannot know that she is trusted until she 
is left alone. Tunick also argues that privacy is necessary for the 
development of an autonomous individual who is willing to freely obey the 
law that she gives herself in the community.  
All of these arguments are modern, one could say humanistic, ones. 
They are grounded variously in modern notions of the self, using in part 
anthropology, in part psychology, and in part phenomenological philosophy 
to argue that privacy and the becoming of a particular type of self are 
intimately related. They are most clearly modern in that they tend to 
universalize this self. At least they make implicit claims that autonomous 
selves are an ideal. Can such arguments as these, or some versions of them, 
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be used to buttress arguments for privacy/confidentiality in a world in which 
universalistic claims are suspect? Can they be used to support rights claims 
at least within societies such as our own? Before addressing these questions 
directly it is necessary to look at a postmodern argument.  
Philosophical Reflections on Privacy: Postmodern Rights Claims  
Richard Rorty (1989) will serve here as the representative of the 
postmodern view. He is the most useful representative for this paper since he 
writes from the tradition of liberal democracy. Rorty's main point, one now 
accepted by most postmodern writers, is that rights are not innate, intrinsic, 
universal, grounded in nature or given by God. They are historically 
contingent and created by societies. Postmodern societies, Rorty writes, are 
characterized by a self-reflectivity that grows out of the knowledge (at least 
on the part of an educated elite) that the liberal values of such societies are 
the product of a particular history. A major set of such values are those 
embedded in claims about human rights. These claims are largely reduced to 
the belief that one has an obligation to avoid inflicting needless pain and 
suffering on others (and working to ensure that one's society avoids this as 
well) and the right not to suffer needless pain oneself. Rorty also holds that 
postmodern societies, at least in the West, also value self-expression, self-
exploration, self-creation and re-creation. Once a culture has recognized that 
its values are the products of historical contingency its members are then 
forced, in order to preserve those values, to freely choose them with full 
knowledge of their contingency. This is effectively a Nietzchean position. Is 
there some way to incorporate this view into an argument for 
privacy/confidentiality and access rights? Would such an incorporation 
strengthen the ALA 's position?  
Synthesis of Modern and Postmodern Positions  
How does one connect the modern, and largely phenomenological, 
works discussed above with Rorty's postmodernist views? The first step in 
doing this is to say that a liberal (broadly defined as one committed to 
democracy and exhibiting a good deal of tolerance and freedom) and self-
reflective (one aware of its own historical contingency and the possible 
relativity of its own values and types of selves) society might choose not only 
its values but also choose to preserve certain types of selves or ways of 
being human. The leading individuals in such a society know that such selves 
may not be universal ones or even entirely defensible as the best possible 
selves. Many individuals in this society may even suspect that it will be 
impossible, or at least very difficult, to define the universally best type of self 
and would acknowledge that types of selves change slowly over time. Yet 
such a society might still choose to value and develop individuals who are 
somewhat autonomous (or experience themselves as such), moral, trusting, 
loving, self-expressive, and capable of freedom. This is largely Rorty's 
postmodern liberal democrat combined with the older phenomenological 
version of a healthy and moral self. If one accepted, as it seems reasonable 
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to do, that the phenomenological arguments are good ones for the necessity 
of privacy for such a self to develop and flourish then one would also argue 
that privacy is to be valued and protected in such a society to the extent that 
such protection is consistent with national security. This is a simple 
combination of the two positions. It can, however, be further refined.  
First, one does not have to accept a full Rortyian-Nietzchean view of 
self-creation and value-creation to make this case. There is an argument 
which would be more acceptable to the general public, more accurate in its 
description of the historical development of autonomous selves, and which 
would answer the anticipated objections of some conservative critics. One 
view of personal identity (an identity that in the West includes the belief in 
the autonomy of the self) is that it depends on narrative. Personal narratives 
are caught up in the narratives told about the larger groups to which 
individuals belong. This is basically a Meadian point (Mead, 1934, Gergen, 
1991). However, its most recent philosophical advocate has been K. Anthony 
Appiah (2005). Appiah has argued that having a specific identity would, in 
part, be a personal achievement but also determined by those larger 
narratives. This fitting together of personal and larger narratives to form an 
identity provides constraint but also makes possible the very existence of a 
self. One is never fully autonomous and yet one can still choose, within 
constraints, what type of self one wants to live out in one's life. The freedom 
to do this may, in fact, be greater in Western societies. At the very least, 
both liberalism (largely a Western phenomenon) and cosmopolitanism 
support greater freedom to construct one's narrative and self (Appiah, 2006).  
Americans, in their national narrative, as in their personal ones, are 
constrained by their pasts. But in this case that constraint works to the 
benefit of those who value privacy rights. There have been competing 
narratives about the meaning of the United States but it safe to say the 
dominant American narrative is one that values freedom in the popular 
sense. An argument made by the ALA for privacy/confidentiality rights based 
on the treasured American belief in becoming the type of self one wishes to 
be may be more rhetorically appealing, therefore, than an argument from 
abstract utilitarianism.  
Secondly, there is a deeper Western narrative at stake, and at work – 
the longer narrative about autonomy than the one Rorty references. Here the 
final stage of the synthesis can be presented. It is here also that the 
synthesis can address the anticipated criticisms of conservative critics of 
liberalism. These critics have detailed a particular conservative critique of 
liberal societies (Devigne, 1994, McAllister, 1995). Such conservatives are of 
concern to this study because they are unlikely to give appropriate weight to 
the preservation of freedom in the balancing of liberty and security. This 
critique of liberal society sees those elements that Rorty and Appiah admire 
as causes of a crisis of values. They believe that awareness on the part of too 
many individuals in a society that its values are not grounded in the 
transcendent but rather are the product of history and/or choice presents the 
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greatest problem for a governing elite. Such an awareness creates a problem 
for culture and for the psychological stability of the members of such 
societies. In the view of these conservative critics a cause of the crisis of 
values in such societies is the widely accepted belief in an autonomous self 
as the source of values. This, in their account, is a belief that becomes 
dominant and popularized in the Enlightenment but takes its most radical 
form in Nietzsche.  
However, the experience of autonomous self, and the high value 
placed upon it, has roots deeper than the Enlightenment. An argument can 
be made that in some form such a self goes back in the West at least as far 
as early Christianity (Schoeman, 1991, Taylor, 1989). Furthermore, in one 
such version of this narrative autonomy need not mean creating values but 
rather means the right and obligation to assent in one's conscience, in one's 
interiority, to objective moral truths. In this second version of the narrative 
the individual as an autonomous moral creature is all the more valued for her 
ability and obligation to give interior assent. This more conservative version 
can be seen in the catechism of the Roman Catholic Church (United States 
Catholic Conference, 1997). Rorty does not give sufficient attention to this 
version of the story, or this version of the autonomous self, in his account 
but neither do the conservatives critics of modernity and postmodernity. 
More strongly, one could argue that when Rorty speaks of self-creation, and 
of historical contingency, that he does not give enough weight to the power 
of the very deep narratives, conditions, and practices that have produced the 
various, albeit related, versions of an autonomous self in the West. These 
selves are ones which may differ from other types of selves in significant 
ways (Yao-Huai, 2005, Nakada and Tamura, 2005, and Capurro, 2005). 
Contingent we, in the liberal West, may be – but an ancient set of 
contingencies has produced us. Once we have been so produced there are 
narrative and other constraints on how easily we can give up our 
autonomous selves. The rights believed and felt to be attached to such selves 
could even be said to be innate in that they are now part of a second nature. 
Even from the conservative perspective outlined above it is hard to see how 
giving up such a belief in, and experience of, an autonomous self would be 
done easily or, perhaps, even safely. Finally, given that there are both 
“Nietzchean” and “Catholic” versions (to give ideal types) of autonomous 
selves today in Western societies it becomes easier to defend both the 
autonomous self and the conditions of freedom, including privacy rights, that 
support and give rise to such selves, since those individuals receptive to such 
arguments are both many and can be found on both the right and the left.  
In regard to access rights, a synthesis of the modern and postmodern 
views first argues that autonomous selves require access to information and 
culture in order to be autonomous – in order to choose what types of lives 
they hope to live out or in order to give true internal assent to what they 
take to be truth. Secondly, however, the synthesis relies heavily upon the 
notion of dialogue. The members of modern societies should, inasmuch as 
they are in fact choosing, or assenting to, their values be sufficiently 
Libraries and the Balance of Liberty and Security, David E. Woolwine. Library Philosophy and Practice 
2007 (September) 
10
sophisticated to know what they are choosing, or assenting to, and why. 
Here there is a need for a public dialogue and for an informed and cultured 
public. The need for dialogue is grounded, however, in something other than, 
but similar to, utilitarianism. It is in the public dialogue that one connects up, 
in critical ways, with larger narratives and where one works to change or 
refine both oneself and such narratives. Freedom of access to information 
and to cultural products are required for this dialogue, consistent with 
national security needs. This is not an absolutist position on either side. A 
balancing of rights and national security claims is needed although there can 
no longer be the rhetoric of a moral calculus. The balancing, a far more 
tentative one with less claims to certainty than even that of the utilitarians, 
itself must come out of a public dialogue, which in turn requires access to 
information and culture. A related consideration is that too many restrictions 
on access may set in motion a downward spiral in which a society is less and 
less able to make educated and informed decisions or, worse, correct itself 
especially as selves undergo changes into less informed and less autonomous 
ones. The critical and thoughtful individual who might inform and correct 
public policy may not have the conditions in which to arise, speak, or pass on 
her views. National narratives, critical and redefining ones, ones which allow 
a culture not just to live but to thrive, may then be stunted in such a 
downward process. A second argument here is not the utilitarian one that 
such a dialogue will likely lead to the greatest good for the greatest number 
or even lead to truth. Nor is it that dialogue is pragmatic (although it is 
pragmatic). This second argument is that ultimately such dialogue is 
constitutive. It is that such a dialogue (dependent upon rights of access to 
information and to cultural products), just like privacy itself, is constitutive 
of, and a necessary precondition for, self-reflective societies made up of self-
reflective, creative, individuals and for the creation of sophisticated 
narratives, both personal and national. Privacy, access to information and 
culture, and public dialogue all cannot be taken out of such societies, nor 
severely curtained, without simply making such societies into something 
other than what they are and, in the process, both gravely endangering the 
survival of such societies and doing grave psychological violence to their 
members. This may not be a grounding argument for such rights but it is one 
that asks that individuals who are doing the balancing to weigh carefully the 
need for privacy/confidentiality and access rights against national security 
needs and to hesitate and think long before making their decisions. 
Destruction of the very types of selves and institutions capable of autonomy 
and dialogue may, in the long run, be as destructive as terrorist attacks.  
Return to the American Library Association  
To return, finally, to the ALA 's forms of reasoning. The ALA 
Councilors, and committee members who participated in the process by 
which the two resolutions were adopted are themselves highly dialogical 
beings. They are constituted by particular types of dialogues. Their selves 
and the process of decision making in a professional organization like the ALA 
(committee meetings, hearings, debate, and ultimately votes taken in public) 
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mirror each other. This dialogue is similar to the type of participatory and 
parliamentary dialogue that takes place in the larger political sphere of liberal 
democracies. This dialogue, a form of Weber's third source of authority 
(bureaucratic/parliamentary legitimacy) “feels” legitimate to educated 
professionals, such as librarians, and is legitimating, because it meshes with 
who and what they are in their experience of themselves. It is also, although 
perhaps slightly less so, legitimating to Americans in general. Most of us 
have been constituted by such dialogues and continue to be so by 
participating in community, professional, educational and democratic 
processes. This article argues that the ALA should follow its deepest instincts 
here. Arguments addressed to the public invoking this understanding of the 
self and of autonomy, and of the need for dialogue, both popular arguments 
and more philosophical ones, may be of greater use than the utilitarian ones 
that are presently employed. (Rights discourse has a stronger rhetorical 
appeal to Americans – but rights discourse is second nature to the types of 
autonomous selves we have become.) The one similarity shared by the 
histories written by Geller, Wiegand, and Robbins is the view that professions 
are not born virginally from Zeus's brow but grow out of the give and take of 
internal debate and external threat. It is clear from their accounts that 
debate in the ALA, prior to the 1970s was vigorous, nuanced, and 
widespread. Some have questioned whether this is still the case 
(Rosenzweig, 2004). It remains to be seen if the ALA can engage in a 
vigorous, nuanced, and internal dialogue about the types of arguments it 
wishes to present to itself and to the public about core ethical issues. If the 
ALA fails to meet the test to develop stronger and more sincerely held 
arguments then it will fail not only itself but the nation which depends upon it 
as one of the intermediate non-governmental institutions charged with acting 
within civil society to preserve the balance between individual liberty and 
national security.  
Appendix One  
Resolution Reaffirming the Principle of Intellectual Freedom in the Aftermath 
of the Terrorist Attacks (CD 19.1)  
WHEREAS: Benjamin Franklin counseled this nation: “They that can give up 
essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor 
safety'; and  
WHEREAS: “The American Library Association believes that freedom of 
expression is an inalienable human right, necessary to self-government, vital 
to the resistance of oppression, and crucial to the cause of justice, and 
further, that the principles of freedom and expression should be applied by 
libraries and libraries throughout the world” (Policy 53,1.12, “Universal Right 
to Free Expression”); now, THEREFORE BE IT  
RESOLVED: that the American Library Association reaffirms the following 
principles, and:  
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Actively promotes dissemination of true and timely information necessary to 
the people in the exercise of their rights (Policy 53.8, “Libraries: An American 
Value”)  
Opposes government censorship of news media and suppression of access to 
unclassified government information (Policy 53.3, “Freedom to Read;” Policy 
53.3 “Shield Laws”);  
Upholds a professional ethic of facilitating access to information, not 
monitoring access (Policy 53.1, “Library Bill of Rights;” Policy 53.1.17 
“Intellectual Freedom Principles for Academic Libraries”);  
Encourages libraries and their staff to protect privacy and confidentiality of 
the people's lawful use of library, its equipment, and its resources (Policy 
52.4, “Policy on Confidentiality of Library Records”);  
Affirms that tolerance of dissent is the hallmark of a free and democratic 
society (Policy 53.1.12, “Universal Right to Free Expression”);  
Opposes the misuse of government power to intimidate, suppress, coerce, or 
compel speech (Policy 53.4, “Policy on Governmental Intimidation;” Policy 
53.6, “Loyalty Oaths”); AND, BE IT FURTHER  
RESOLVED: that this resolution be forwarded to the President of the United 
States, to the Attorney General of the United States, and to both Houses of 
Congress.  
Adopted by the ALA Council, January 23, 2002  
Appendix Two  
Resolution on the USA Patriot Act and Related Measures that Infringe on the 
Rights of Library Users (CD20.1)  
WHEREAS: The American Library Association affirms the responsibility of the 
leaders of the United States to protect and preserve the freedoms that are 
the foundations of our democracy; and  
WHEREAS: Libraries are a critical force for promoting the free flow and 
unimpeded distribution of knowledge for individuals, institutions, and 
communities; and  
WHEREAS: The American Library Association holds that suppression of ideas 
undermines democratic society; and  
WHEREAS: Certain provisions of the USA Patriot Act, the revised Attorney 
General Guidelines to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other related 
measures expand the authority of the federal government to investigate 
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citizens and non-citizens, to engage in surveillance, and to threaten civil 
liberties guaranteed under the United States Constitution and Bill of Rights; 
and  
WHEREAS: The USA Patriot Act and other recently enacted laws, regulations, 
and guidelines increase the likelihood that the activities of library users, 
including their use of computers to browse the Web or access e-mail, may 
come under government surveillance without their knowledge or consent; 
now, therefore, be it  
RESOLVED: That the American Library Association opposes any use of 
government power to suppress the free and open exchange of knowledge 
and information or to intimidate individuals exercising free inquiry; and, be it 
further,  
RESOLVED: That the American Library Association encourages all libraries, 
library administrators, library governing bodies, and library advocates to 
educate their users, staff, and communities about the process for compliance 
with the USA Patriot Act and other related measures and about the dangers 
to individual privacy and the confidentiality of library records resulting from 
those measures; and, be it further  
RESOLVED: That the American Library Association urges librarians 
everywhere to defend and support user privacy and free and open access to 
knowledge and information; and, be it further  
RESOLVED: That the American Library Association will work with other 
organizations, as appropriate, to protect the rights of inquiry and free 
expression; and, be it, further  
RESOLVED: That the American Library Association will take actions 
appropriate to obtain and publicize information about the surveillance of 
libraries and library users by law enforcement agencies and to assess the 
impact on library users and their communities; and, be it further  
RESOLVED: That the American Library Association urges all libraries to adopt 
and implement patron privacy and record retention policies that affirm that 
“the collection of personally identifiable information should be a matter of 
routine or policy when necessary for the fulfillment of the mission of the 
library.” ( ALA Privacy: An Interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights ); and, 
be it further  
RESOLVED: That the American Library Association considers sections of the 
USA Patriot Act area a present danger to the constitutional rights and privacy 
rights of library users and urges the United States Congress to:  
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•  provide active oversight of the implementation of the USA Patriot Act and 
other related measures, and the revised Attorney General Guidelines to the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation;  
•  hold hearings to determine the extent of the surveillance on library users 
and their communities; and  
•  amend or change the sections of these laws and the guidelines that 
threaten or abridge the rights of inquiry and free expression; and, be it 
further  
RESOLVED: That this resolution be forwarded to the President of the United 
States, to the Attorney General of the United States, to Members of both 
Houses of Congress, to the library community, and to others as appropriate.  
Adopted by the ALA Council, January 29, 2003.  
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